Sham City
On 29 September 2026, the Premier League (“PL”) released a statement confirming that a PL Commission had found that 114 of the 115 charges brought by the PL against Manchester City FC (“MCFC”) in February 2023 (“the Charges”) had been proved.
The PL’s statement explained:
‘An independent Commission has found Manchester City FC guilty of all charges related to serious breaches of the Premier League’s financial rules over a nine-season period, and the majority of charges in relation to its failure to co-operate with the League’s investigation.
The independent Commission found that between Seasons 2009/10 and 2017/18:
- Manchester City arranged ‘sham’ contracts (which misrepresented the true agreement between the parties) with a number of its commercial partners, as well as relying on ‘sham’ agreements with others, to artificially inflate the club’s revenues and reduce its costs
- The club filed misstated accounts and concealed the true state of its finances from its auditors and football regulators
- Manchester City was significantly in breach of both the Premier League’s and UEFA’s spending limits
- During the Premier League’s investigation, Manchester City committed multiple breaches of its duties of co-operation and utmost good faith towards the League (three of the four alleged breaches were upheld)’.
A copy of the PL Commission’s ‘Core Decision’ was released along with the PL’s statement, which the PL’s statement describes as follows:
‘The independent Commission’s findings are set out in a Core Decision, of which a redacted version has been published […] The Commission’s award comprises both the Core Decision and a large number of additional appendices, which the League is committed to publishing as soon as it is able.
The League is able to publish the Core Decision because the Commission has ruled (and an Appeal Board has confirmed) that the Commission’s decision is a ‘final award’.
Now that the charges have been proved, the issue of sanction will be addressed separately in a further hearing with the independent Commission. In accordance with Premier League rules, that hearing will remain private and confidential until such a time as publication of the outcome is permitted’.
In paragraph 4 of the Core Decision, the PL Commission provides the following explanation in respect of the Core Decision:
‘This document and the Appendices annexed to it and referenced herein set out our findings on the Charges. This document also contains an overview of the more detailed matters addressed and findings made in the individual Appendices; it is intended to provide a roadmap through those Appendices. This document and the Appendices are to be read as a whole. Together they comprise the decision and reasoning of the Commission – ‘our Decision’’.
As the Appendices to the Core Decision are currently unpublished, the PL Commission’s legal and/or regulatory analysis, and evidential analysis, cannot presently be considered or analysed. However, the Core Decision provides a fascinating overview of the PL Commission’s findings, which are damning to MCFC.
This article will summarise the Core Decision, and consider what sanctions are available to the PL Commission to impose on MCFC.
It should be noted, however, that MCFC can appeal against the Decision, and pursuant to PL Rules, r. W.81 (and as confirmed in the PL’s statement), MCFC has until 2 October 2026 to make such an appeal (and which indicates that the PL Commission handed down the Decision on 18 September 2026, assuming the standard appeal process identified in the current version of the PL Rules is being applied).
Further, readers may be interested to see some of the issues and evidence concerning the Charges that were also relevant and considered in UEFA’s disciplinary proceedings brought against MCFC in 2019 and decided upon by UEFA’s Club Financial Control Body, and ultimately the Court of Arbitration for Sport, in 2020. If so, readers are invited to read these two previous Football Law articles:
- MCFC v UEFA: Rubbish In, Rubbish Out
The Core Decision
The PL Commission identified that the ‘serious wrongdoing by the PL against [MCFC] by each Charge required strong, cogent evidence to prove that individual Charge […] with the exception of charge 4(B) we were satisfied to the requisite standard that there was such evidence’.[1] The PL Commission explained that ‘No stone was left unturned’ and that throughout the hearing of the Charges the ‘issues were fiercely contested between the parties’.[2]
The PL Commission noted in respect of the availability of witness evidence and documentary evidence that ‘Despite the vast number of documents that were available, and the extensive factual evidence that was given by witnesses who did appear at the hearing, the evidential picture available to us was therefore not as complete as it might have been’.[3]
Notably, the PL commission made the following observation in respect of the witness evidence provided:
‘29) We concluded that the majority of the witnesses of fact who have evidence before use were doing their best to provide honest evidence and to assist us in our determination of the Charges. However, as set out principally in […] Appendix 6 we concluded
a) That evidence given by a number of important factual witnesses called to give evidence on behalf of [MCFC] was false in a number of key respects, and
b) That certain of those factual witnesses had given evidence at the hearing that they knew to be untrue and so had been dishonest’.
As a roadmap for Core Decision, the PL Commission identified that the Charges had been categorised as follows:
‘The breaches alleged to have been committed by [MCFC] were divided by the PL into 4 broad categories – Charges 1, 2, 3 and 4. Charge 1 was divided into four sub-charges – Charges 1(A), 1(B), 1(C) and 1(D). Charge 4 was also divided into four sub-charges – Charges 4(A), 4(B), 4(C), 4(D). We refer to those together as ‘the Charges’’.[4]
In paragraphs 37-45 of the Core Decision, the PL Commission provided a helpful explanation of what each of the categories of the Charges concerned:
Charge 1 – Annual accounts
Charge 1 concerned the accuracy and adequacy of MCFC’s annual accounts.
Under the PL Rules, each member club was required to submit annual accounts which had been prepared and audited in accordance with the applicable legal and regulatory requirements. The PL Commission determined that this required the accounts to provide a true and fair view of a member club’s financial position and to contain sufficient information concerning any related party transactions to enable a reader to understand their effect on the financial statements (“the Accounts Submission Requirement”). (See what are now PL Rules, rr. E.3 and E.49.)
In broad terms, therefore, Charge 1 concerned whether the accounts submitted by MCFC to the PL accurately and adequately presented MCFC’s true financial position.
Charge 2 – UEFA Financial Fair Play
Charge 2 concerned MCFC’s compliance with UEFA’s Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations (“CLFFPRs”) that had been in place since 2013/2014.
A central provision of the CLFFPRs was (as in place at the relevant time and until 2022) the break-even requirement. A club seeking to participate in UEFA club competitions was required to submit break-even results, calculated in accordance with the CLFFPRs, reflecting the difference between its relevant income and expenditure during the applicable monitoring period. Those results were required to meet prescribed financial thresholds. (See MCFC, UEFA, FFP and the CAS for a full explanation of the CLFFPRs as in place at the relevant time.)
Crucially, the PL Rules required member clubs to comply with applicable UEFA Statutes and Regulations (see what is now PL Rules, r. B.14.6). Accordingly, a failure to comply with the CLFFPRs was also capable of amounting to a breach of the PL Rules.
Charge 3: Profitability and Sustainability Rules
Charge 3 was, in effect, the domestic financial fair play charge.
Since 2015/16, the PL’s Profitability and Sustainability Rules (“PSR”) have required a club’s aggregated adjusted earnings before tax to remain within prescribed financial thresholds when assessed over a rolling three-year period. For the purposes relevant to the Charges, that meant that a member club could not incur losses of more than £105 million (known as the Upper Loss Threshold) over each three-year period. A club exceeding that upper loss threshold would be in breach of the PSR. (Readers are invited to read Football Law’s earlier articles addressing other PL clubs’ breaches of the Upper Loss Threshold under the PSR. Football Law’s last article focusing a PL member club subject to the Upper Loss Threshold of £105 million was Everton’s Double Trouble).
Put shortly, therefore, whereas Charge 2 concerned MCFC’s compliance with UEFA’s financial requirements, Charge 3 concerned compliance with the PL’s financial requirements.
Charge 4: Cooperation with the PL investigation
Charge 4 was different in character. It did not concern MCFC’s underlying financial position, but rather MCFC’s conduct during the PL’s investigation of MCFC.
The PL Rules require member clubs to comply with certain requests made by the PL during an investigation (see, inter alia, what is now PL Rules, r. W.1-5 and W.20). Charge 4 therefore concerned alleged breaches of MCFC’s duties of cooperation with the PL’s investigation.
Utmost good faith
Finally, underpinning the regulatory framework was a broader obligation of utmost good faith (see what is now PL Rules, r. B15). At all material times, PL clubs were required to act with utmost good faith both towards the PL and towards their fellow member clubs. This includes a requirement not to act dishonestly towards the PL or any other member club, and not to engage in conduct that is intended to circumvent the PL Rules or obstruct the investigation of compliance with the same.
This duty is important as it provides the wider regulatory context in which the four Charges, and particularly the allegations concerning MCFC’s financial reporting and its dealings with the PL, fell to be considered.
In addressing each of the Charges, the Core Decision states that it provides a ‘high level overview’ of the PL Commission’s detailed findings in the Appendices, and ‘is not intended to detract from [the] detailed factual findings’ that available in the appendices (which, as indicated by the PL’s statement, will be published in due course).[5]
The Core Decision sets out in paragraphs 47-101 some of the factual background relevant to Charges 1, 2 and 3. Whilst some of the factual background in those paragraphs is redacted, the following is identified from the Core Decision:
In September 2008, Abu Dhabi United Group (“ADUG”), ‘a private [Abu Dhabi] investment company ultimately owned by HH Sheikh Mansour]’ acquired a 90% shareholding in MCFC, and, in 2009, acquired the remaining 10%.[6]
Following that acquisition, and with high ambitions for MCFC, ‘[MCFC] appreciated from the early day’s of ADUG’s ownership that very significant funds would be required if the steps needed to realise [redacted] ambitions were to be fulfilled. It was recognised that in the short-term those funds would have to come from substantial equity contributions from the Club’s owner – ADUG […]’.[7] In the first two seasons of ADUG’s ownership, equity investment of £485 million was provided by ADUG.[8]
To move away from that unsustainable model, MCFC sought to ‘increase its commercial revenues […] by seeking high-value sponsorship arrangements in the UAE generally and in [Abu Dhabi] in particular]’.[9]
In the time that followed, MCFC entered several Abu Dhabi (“AD”) sponsorship agreements (which the Core Decision explains will be available in Appendix 4).
The PL’s case was that ‘Aside from [redacted] none of the AD Sponsorship Agreements were the result of arm’s length commercial negotiations between [MCFC] and the relevant AD Sponsor, or […] were at [Fair Market Value]’.[10] Further, the PL’s case was also that the sponsorship fees identified in the AD sponsorship agreements (“the Recorded Sponsorship Fees”) were ‘neither payable in full or in fact paid in full by the relevant AD Sponsor’.[11] Instead the PL identified that an AD Sponsor would pay only part of the Recorded Sponsorship Fee (“the Base Sum”) and that the balance between the Recorded Sponsorship Fee and the Base Sum (“the Tagged Sum”) would be paid by ADUG.[12]
The Core Decision refers to those agreements identified by the PL as being ‘Disguised Funding Scheme’.[13] The PL’s overall position was that the AD Sponsorship Agreements were shams.[14]
The significance of the Disguised Funding Scheme to MCFC, in place from early 2010 onwards, was that it needed commercial revenues to move away from equity contributions from ADUG, particularly considering that the then impending or proposed UEFA and PL financial fair play rules would not count equity contributions in the calculations relevant for compliance with the same.[15]
The Core Decision identifies that the Disguised Funding Scheme was as suggested by the PL above, and that ‘Despite only the Base Sum truly being commercial revenue [… MCFC] (i) Would treat the entirety of the Recorded Sponsorship Fees as commercial revenues, and (ii) Would conceal the fact that the Tagged Sum was in fact equity contribution/investment by ADUG’.[16] The Disguised Funding Scheme therefore concealed the true extent of equity contributions being made by ADUG to MCFC, and gave ‘the misleading impression to third parties […] in [MCFC’s] financial statements and any required FFP returns that [MCFC’s] commercial revenues from AD Sponsorship Agreements […] were far, far greater than was in fact the case’.[17]
The Core Decision identifies that, despite some minor adjustments to maintain its disguised nature, MCFC ‘continued to operate the Disguised Funding Scheme for each of the seasons under scrutiny in these proceedings’.[18] The outcome of that was that in the seasons 2009/10 to 2017/18, MCFC represented in its financial statements that it had received commercial revenue from AD Sponsors totalling £949.94 million.[19] However, in reality, only £119.25 million of that total represented Base Fees for which AD sponsors were liable and had paid.[20] The remaining £830.69 million of the total represented Tagged Sums, for which ADUG was liable and had paid, and which ought to have been properly recorded as equity contributions from ADUG.[21]
Whilst MCFC presented a defence that the Tagged Sums were not as defined but were in fact the result of financial assistance provided to the AD Sponsors by the AD Government via the Crown Prince Court, the PL Commission considered this explanation to be untrue and was one ‘concocted well after the event in an attempt to obscure and conceal the realities of the Disguised Funding Scheme’.[22] (The Core Decision identifies that the PL Commission’s detailed findings on the Disguised Funding Scheme and MCFC’s defence will be available in Appendix 15.)
The Core Decision identifies that as a consequence of the Disguised Funding Scheme, MCFC, inter alia, MCFC negotiated ‘a host of AD Sponsorship Agreements which contained Recorded Sponsorship Fees […] Far in excess of the [Fair Market Value] of the rights granted’ which were ‘shams and/or did not reflect the economic substance of the arrangements that [MCFC] in fact had with its AD Sponsors’.[23] Further, the Core Decision identifies that for each of the seasons between 2009/10 and 2017/18, MCFC submitted financial statements to the PL that identified the full Recorded Sponsorship Fees as commercial revenue, which were used by the PL to assess whether MCFC had complied with the PSR in 2015/16, 2016/17 and 2017/18. Similarly, for each of the seasons between 2013/14 and 2017/18, MCFC also submitted financial statements to UEFA to the same effect in respect of the CLFFPR.[24]
The Core Decision also identifies other methods by which MCFC disguised its financial performance.[25] One of which was by something defined as the ‘Fordham Agreement’ entered by MCFC and ‘Fordham’, whereby ADUG funds were used by Fordham to acquire ‘at a sizeable, artificially-inflated price’ MCFC’s entitlement to benefit from its players’ image rights.[26] This allowed MCFC to show such funds as operating income and, at the same time, remove operating expenses from its financial statements.[27]
Consequently, and in summary, the Core Decision identifies that MCFC’s ‘financial statements for those seasons between 2009/10 and 2017/18 did not show a true and fair view of [MCFC’s] financial position’.[28]
The Core Decision then addresses the Charges upon application of those factual findings.
Charge 1(A)
The Core Decision identifies that ‘Each of the AS Sponsorship Agreements [redacted] was a sham’ and, alternatively, that ‘the economic substance of each AD Sponsorship Agreement differed from the legal form of the relevant AD Sponsorship Agreement in that the Tagged Sum element of the Recorded Sponsorship Fee was an equity contribution payable and paid by ADUG not commercial revenue payable and paid by the AD Sponsor’.[29]
Consequently, the Core Decision explains that, either way, MCFC’s financial statements provided in the seasons to which Charge 1(A) relates were ‘substantially overstated’ and did not provide a true and fair value of MCFC’s financial position.[30] Therefore, for those seasons concerned, MCFC breached the Accounts Submission Requirements, and MCFC knew it was committing or was reckless in committing those breaches.[31] The Core Decision also identifies that these breaches also amounted to breaches of MCFC’s duty of utmost good faith.[32]
Charge 1(B)
A significant amount of detail of the matters relating to Charge 1(B) are redacted, and it is not possible to provide a full explanation of the same, save to say that they appear to relate to three instances of other methods used by MCFC to disguise its financial performance (i.e., similar to that seen by the Fordham Agreement).
However, it can be identified that each of those three methods were a ‘sham’ and, alternatively, ‘the economic substance of such agreements and the [redacted] as a whole differed from the legal forms of those agreements, in that the liability recorded therein was a liability of MCFC (1) which was [MCFC] obligation to pay, and (2) which ADUG paid on [MCFC’s] behalf’.[33]
Accordingly, the breaches proved by the PL under 1(A) were also proved in respect of Charge 1(B), in addition to breaches of other, associated provisions in the PL Rules applicable to the agreements concerned in two of the three methods used by MCFC.[34]
Charge 1(C)
The Core Decision identifies that the agreements underlying the Fordham Agreement were a ‘sham’ and, alternatively, that ‘the economic substance of those agreements and the Fordham Agreement as a whole differed from the legal form of those agreements, in that a) The fee paid to [MCFC] to acquire the image rights was an injection of funds into [MCFC] by ADUG. It was an equity contribution not operating income b) The liability to make image rights payments was a liability of [MCFC] (1) which it was [MCFC’s] obligation to pay, and (2) which ADUG paid on its behalf’.[35]
Consequently, the Core Decision explains that, either way MCFC’s financial statements provided in the seasons to which Charge 1(C) relates did not, inter alia, provide a true and fair value of MCFC’s financial position.[36]
Accordingly, the breaches proved by the PL under 1(A) were also proved in respect of Charge (C).[37]
Charge 1(D)
The Core Decision identifies that the AD Sponsorship Agreements were ‘related party transactions’, and that for each of the ‘nine season to which this Charge 1(D) relates’ MCFC ought to have disclosed that the AD Sponsorship Agreements were transactions with a related, and ‘provided sufficient information about the relationships’ to allow the PL to understand the impact of the AD Sponsorship Agreements upon MCFC’s financial statements.[38] The Core Decision finds that MCFC’s financial statements ‘did not make any such (or any such sufficient) disclosures’.[39]
Consequently, the Core Decision identifies that the MCFC’s financial statements were 'not prepared and audited in accordance with applicable legal and regulatory principles’.[40]
Accordingly, the breaches proved by the PL under 1(A) were also proved in respect of Charge 1(D).[41]
Charge 2
Following the findings made in respect of Charge 1(A), 1(B) and 1(C), the Core Decision identifies that MCFC’s accounts ‘fall to be restated’ to remove the overstated commercial revenue and operating income, and to add in its understated liabilities and operating expenses.[42]
Further, the Core Decision identifies that upon such restatement, MCFC ‘did not (by a very substantial amount) meet the break-even requirement set out in the CLFFPRs (as so varied by the UEFA 2014 Settlement Agreement) in any of the seasons to which Charge 2 relates’.[43] In such circumstances, MCFC failed to comply with the CLFFPR in each of the seasons to which Charge 2 relates.[44]
A similar finding was also made in the alternative in respect of Charge 1(D) insofar as the AD Sponsorship Agreements fall to be reduced down to Fair Market Value for the purposes of the CLFFPR.[45]
Charge 3
Following the findings made in respect of Charge 1(A), 1(B) and 1(C), the Core Decision identifies that MCFC’s accounts fall to be restated in the same way identified in respect of Charge 2.[46]
Further, the Core Decision identifies that upon such restatement, MCFC ‘did not (by a very substantial amount) meet the PSR requirements in any of the seasons to which Charge 3 relates’.[47] In such circumstances, MCFC failed to comply with the PSR in each of the seasons to which Charge 3 relates.[48]
A similar finding was also made in the alternative in respect of Charge 1(D) insofar as the AD Sponsorship Agreements fall to be reduced down to Fair Market Value for the purposes of the PSR.[49]
Charge 4
There is a dearth of information available in the Core Decision identifying the basis for the PL Commission’s decision in respect of Charge 4 (albeit it is identified that such information will be available in Appendices 33 and 34). Nonetheless, the Core Decision identifies that MCFC ‘made concerted efforts to stop and frustrate the PL investigation’ and that MCFC breached its duties of cooperation in the majority of the matters set out in Charge 4(A), in each of the matters set out in Charge 4(C), and in the matter set out in Charge 4(D).
The only charge not proved against MCFC, across the entirety of the Charges MCFC faced, was in the matters set out in Charge 4(B).
Sanction
The scale and nature of the PL Commission’s findings mean that the question of sanction to impose on MCFC goes significantly beyond the type of straightforward PSR breaches previously considered by other PL Commissions (not least because there are breaches of the PL Rules outside of the PSR). The PL Commission found that MCFC committed sustained and intentional conduct over a period of years which disguised hundreds of millions of pounds of owner funding, caused MCFC’s accounts materially to misstate its true financial position, resulted in substantial breaches of both UEFA and Premier League financial requirements, and was followed by breaches of MCFC’s obligations to cooperate with the PL’s investigation.
Whilst points deductions imposed on other clubs for breach of the PSR (and/or the English Football League’s (“EFL”) Championship Profitability and Sustainability Rules) provide helpful guidance on sanction in respect of the Charges relating to PSR breaches proved against MCFC, the situation facing the PL Commission on sanction is unprecedented.
PL Rules, r. W.64 provides the PL Commission with wide-ranging and non-exhaustive powers in respect of sanction, subject to the requirement that any sanction(s) imposed is proportionate. The following provides an indication of the type of sanction that MCFC could face.
Points deduction
Readers will be aware that Football Law has provided several articles analysing previous decisions of PL Commissions and Appeal Boards in respect of sanctions imposed for breaches of the PSR, and readers are invited, at the least, to read the last of those articles published on 16 April 2024: Everton’s Double Trouble, and particularly the 14-point approach that PL Commissions appear to take when determining a proportionate sanction for a breach of the PSR.
Whilst it is identifiable from the Core Decision that MCFC breached the PSR for the years 2015/16, 2016/17 and 2017/18, it is not identifiable by how much MCFC breached the Upper Loss Threshold under the PSR for each relevant three-year period. Nonetheless, it is noted that, taking the Core Decision’s primary finding in respect of Charge 3, that MCFC ‘did not (by a very substantial amount) meet the PSR requirements in any of the seasons to which Charge 3 relates’ (emphasis added). The PL Commission’s description of each breach as being ‘by a very substantial amount’ therefore indicates that the breaches were substantial even before other aggravating features are considered.
It is known that a breach of the Upper Loss Threshold under the PSR is very likely to result in a points deduction, with the starting point being a three-point deduction for a single offence, and that there is to be a further one point added to the starting point for every £6.5 million above the PSR upper loss threshold (albeit that precise mathematical approach is not strict sanction guidance).
It is also identifiable that MCFC cannot point to an early admission of the PSR breaches, and any claim for mitigation based upon cooperation is necessarily complicated by the findings made under Charge 4, subject to how far the consequences of the unproven Charge 4(B) stretches in MCFC’s favour (see also footnote 13 on page 29 of the Core Decision). Conversely, MCFC’s intentional conduct, and active efforts to stop and frustrate the PL’s investigation, are likely to be aggravating factors that could increase any points deduction.
One factor that may go in MCFC’s favour is what arose from The Football Association Premier League Limited (t/a The Premier League) v Everton Football Club Company Limited, PL Commission (Ch. James Drake KC), 8 April 2024 (“the EFC PLC 2024 Decision”). In the EFC PLC 2024 Decision, Everton FC (“EFC”) benefited from a reduction to the points deduction to be imposed for its breach of the Upper Loss Threshold in that case because their breach of the Upper Loss Threshold encompassed financial years that had been the subject of a previous sanction for breach of the Upper Loss Threshold in an earlier three-year accounting period (see Everton Football Club Company Limited v The Football Association Premier League Limited (t/a The Premier League), PL Appeal Board (Ch. The Rt. Hon. Sir Gary Hickinbottom), 26 February 2024) (“the EFC PLAB 2024 Decision”). This is known as the principle of double jeopardy (also known as the principle of ne bis in idem). Whether the principle can apply where, as here, multiple overlapping PSR breaches fall to be sanctioned together is less straightforward. It will be interesting to see whether MCFC advances such an argument, and, if so, how the PL Commission deals with it.
From all the previous cases available in respect of breaches of the PSR Upper Loss Threshold, in the EFC PLAB 2024 Decision, EFC received the highest points deduction imposed on a PL club, being a six-point deduction for breach the Upper Loss Threshold by £19.5 million.
The EFL PLAB Decision 2024 and the above-stated framework are useful to have in mind when trying to gauge how the PL Commission will determine a proportionate sanction to impose on MCFC in this case. Considering that MCFC has breached the Upper Loss Threshold in each of the three accounting periods ‘by a very substantial amount’, intentionally (or at the least recklessly) participated in the conduct underlying Charges 1(A), (B) and (C), also breached the break-even requirement under UEFA’s CLFFPR, failed to cooperate with the PL, and failed to act with utmost good faith, then it is reasonable to anticipate that any points deduction against MCFC would be considerably higher than the six-point deduction imposed on EFC.
Relegation or expulsion from the PL
PL Rules, r. W.64 does not expressly identify that the PL Commission has the power to sanction a member club with relegation, however it is at least possible considering that the PL Commission can ‘make such other order as it thinks fit’ (PL Rules, r. W.64.11).
PL Rules, r. W64.4.4, however, expressly identifies that the PL Commission can ‘recommend that the League expels the Respondent from membership in accordance with the provision of Rule B.6’.
This would be a draconian sanction to impose against MCFC (which, understandably, some may consider warranted), and an unprecedented one. There is also the issue that the sanction is a recommendation only. Even if the PL Commission makes the recommendation, that sanction would only bite if the remaining PL member clubs vote in favour of acting upon that recommendation pursuant to PL Rules, r. B.6:
‘Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 14.10, the League may expel a Club from membership upon a special Resolution to that effect being passed by a majority of not less than three-quarters of such members as (being entitled to do so) vote by their representatives or by proxy at a General Meeting of which notice specifying the intention to propose the Resolution has been duly given’.
Accordingly, for that sanction to bite, 15 of the remaining 19 PL member clubs would have to vote in favour of the recommendation. How the remaining 19 PL member clubs vote on the recommendation is their prerogative, which will be swayed by several factors. It is impossible to predict how PL member clubs would vote, but the requirement that a special resolution be passed to expel MCFC from the PL – and the uncertainty surrounding the same – may militate against the PL Commission imposing this sanction on MCFC (or of course it may be an irrelevant factor to the PL Commission).
In any event, making the recommendation would demonstrate the seriousness with which MCFC’s breaches are being treated, and could be used in conjunction with other sanctions to that effect (PL Rules, r. W.64.7). Considering the impact MCFC’s breaches have had upon the integrity of the PL competition over the years that the Charges cover (and which necessarily bleeds into subsequent years), such an approach would appear to chime with the guidance provided by the Appeal Board in paragraph 199 of EFC PLAB 2024: ‘punishment is far less important than maintaining the integrity of the competition and thus the sport of football, with deterrence being an important overlapping aim’.
It is also worth noting that expulsion from the PL would not necessarily mean that MCFC would simply be relegated to the EFL Championship. EFL Regulations, reg. 11.6.2 expressly contemplates the circumstances arising where a PL club loses its membership, and the accompanying guidance to EFL Regulation, reg. 11.6.2 expressly recognises that ‘under FA Rules The League could be asked to accommodate any former Premier League Club(s) in League Two’. Accordingly, if MCFC was expelled from the PL, there is at least the possibility that any subsequent admission to the EFL would be into League Two rather than the Championship.
Additionally, should MCFC be expelled during the current 2026/27 season, PL Rules, r. C.15 identifies that the following would take place:
‘If any Club ceases during the Season to be a member of the League, the record of the League Matches in which it has participated in that Season’s Competition shall be expunged from the League Table and […] the number of Clubs to be relegated following the completion of the Competition shall be reduced so as to maintain at 20 (or, if less, as near thereto as may be) the number of Clubs in membership of the League at the beginning of the next Season’.
Fine
PL Rules, r. W.64.4 states that a PL Commission can ‘impose upon the Respondent a fine unlimited in amount and suspend any part thereof’. Fines have not ordinarily been imposed in cases concerning breaches of the PSR Upper Loss Threshold. Moreover, considering that MCFC are likely to face claims for compensation from other clubs (see PL Rules, rr. W.31 and W.64.5), and a significant costs order in respect of the PL’s costs incurred in respect of the Charges (PL Rules, r. W.64.9), then a fine does not necessarily seem to be the most effective sanction that could be imposed to maintain the integrity of the competition and deter similar conduct.
Conclusion
The findings made against MCFC are extraordinary. This is not simply a case in which a club has been found to have exceeded the financial limits imposed upon it. The PL Commission has found that, over numerous seasons, MCFC deliberately disguised substantial amounts of owner funding as commercial revenue, submitted accounts which materially misstated its true financial position, circumvented the PL Rules, substantially breached both PL and UEFA financial requirements, and subsequently sought to frustrate the PL’s investigation into that conduct.
Precisely what consequences follow from those findings remains to be seen. MCFC retains a right of appeal, but, absent any successful appeal, the PL Commission will proceed to determine the appropriate sanction based upon the findings it has made. What is clear, however, is that the PL Commission is faced with a sanctioning exercise for which previous PSR cases provide no direct precedent (it of course being appreciated that there is no strict rule of precedent in such cases).
The difficulty now facing the PL Commission may therefore not simply be determining how many points MCFC’s breaches are worth. It is determining what sanction is sufficient to protect the integrity of the PL competition in circumstances where the breaches found were themselves directed at circumventing the rules designed to protect that integrity.
Ultimately, any sanction must be proportionate, but the gravity, duration and intentional nature of the breaches found against MCFC will necessarily form part of the assessment of what proportionality requires.
Footnotes
[1] The Football Association Premier League Limited v Manchester City Football Club Limited, PL Commission (Ch. Redacted), undated; published 29 September 2026, [6].
[2] Ibid, [9].
[3] Ibid, [24].
[4] Ibid, [1].
[5] Ibid, [46].
[6] Ibid, [49].
[7] Ibid, [52].
[8] Ibid, [53].
[9] Ibid, [54].
[10] Ibid, [63(a)].
[11] Ibid, [63(b)].
[12] Ibid, [63(b)(i)].
[13] Ibid, [63(b)].
[14] Ibid, [63(c)].
[15] Ibid, [64]-[66].
[16] Ibid, [67(c)].
[17] Ibid, [68].
[18] Ibid, [71].
[19] Ibid, [72].
[20] Ibid, [72(a)].
[21] Ibid, [72(b)]; see also (n8) of the Core Decision.
[22] Ibid, [76]-[77].
[23] Ibid, [80]-[81].
[24] Ibid, [81](a)-(b)].
[25] Ibid, [85]-[100].
[26] Ibid, [85].
[27] Ibid, [86].
[28] Ibid, [101].
[29] Ibid, [110]-[111].
[30] Ibid, [112].
[31] Ibid, [113].
[32] Ibid, [114].
[33] Ibid, [116]-[117], [123]-[124] and [130]-[131].
[34] Ibid, [119]-[121], [125]-[128], [133]-[134].
[35] Ibid, [135]-[137].
[36] Ibid, [138].
[37] Ibid, [139]-[140].
[38] Ibid, [143].
[39] Ibid, [144].
[40] Ibid, [145].
[41] Ibid, [145]-[146].
[42] Ibid, [149(a)].
[43] Ibid, [149(b)].
[44] Ibid, [149(c)].
[45] Ibid, [150].
[46] Ibid, [153(a)].
[47] Ibid, [153(b)].
[48] Ibid, [153(c)].
[49] Ibid, [154].
1 October 2026