May and June 2025 Roundup
A roundup of football law news and decisions from May and June 2025:
Mykhailo Mudryk charged with breach of FA’s Anti-Doping Regulations
As explained in Football Law’s November and December 2024 Roundup, Chelsea FC’s Mykhailo Mudryk (“MM”) had been provisionally suspended by the FA for an Adverse Analytical Finding in a urine sample provided by MM in accordance with the FA’s Anti-Doping Regulations (“FAADR”).
On 18 June 2025, it was reported that MM had been charged by the FA with a breach of the FAADR, and a statement provided by the FA to the BBC stated:
‘We can confirm that [MM] has been charged with anti-doping rule violations alleging the presence and/or use of a prohibited substance, in terms of regulations 3 and 4 of the [FAADR]’.
It is still unknown what prohibited substance was present in MM’s sample, although some news reports suggest it is meldonium, which is a non-Specified Substance prohibited at all times (in competition and out of competition), as identified in WADA’s Prohibited List 2024).
MM remains provisionally suspended and faces a suspension of four years unless he can demonstrate that his FAADR violation was not intentional (FAADR, reg. 77(a)). If MM can prove, on the balance of probabilities, that his FAADR violation was not intentional, then the starting point for any suspension will be two years (FAADR, reg. 69, 78 and 79), and could be reduced further, even all the way down to no period of suspension, depending on, inter alia, the level of fault attributed to MM’s FAADR violation and/or whether the Prohibited Substance came from a Contaminated Product (FAADR, reg. 83-85).
Bruno Lage claims against Eagle Footballs Holdings Bidco Limited
Bruno Lage (“BL”), head coach at Sport Lisboa e Benfica and formerly of Botafogo de Futebol e Regatas SAF (“Botafogo”) and Wolverhampton Wanderers FC, has brought a claim in the High Court of England and Wales against Eagle Football Holdings Bidco Limited (“Eagle”), the holding company and/or ultimate beneficial owner of, inter alia, shareholdings in Crystal Palace FC (“CPFC”) and Olympique Lyonnais (“OL”).
BL’s claim is brought in respect of (i) a contract for BL’s employment as head coach of Botafogo from around July 2023 to 31 December 2023 (“the Botafogo Contract”); and (ii) a retainment agreement entered on 9 July 2023 between BL and Eagle, which provided for Eagle and/or its associated companies to retain BL’s services upon expiry of the Botafogo Contract (“the Retainment Contract”).
The recital to the Retainment Contract stated, inter alia:
‘i) The Parties have agreed that during the period 1 January 2024 to 15 April 2024 (the ‘Restricted Period’), Eagle […] must use its powers as beneficial owner [CPFC] and OL to offer [BL] a new position as head coach of the men’s professional football first team at either [CPFC] or [OL]. Said offer will include allowing [BL] to appoint his Technical Staff.
[…]
j) If [BL] and his Technical Staff accept roles with [CPFC] or OL during the Restricted Period, then their combined salaries will be USD3,600,000 […] per annum […] The division of this sum is to be determined by [BL].
k) if [BL] determines to accept alternative employment from a Sporting Entity during the Restricted Period, then he agrees to pay Eagle […] USD3,600,000 […] in compensation.
[…]
The Parties intend this Retainment Agreement to be legally binding’.
Clauses 2.2, 2.7 and 2.10 of the Retainment Agreement stated:
‘2.2 During the Restricted Period, Eagle […] must exercise its power as shareholder and member of [CPFC] and OL to ensure that either [CPFC] or OL offer BL] the role of head coach of their men’s professional football first team (the ‘Job Offer’).
[…]
2.7 If Eagle […] fails to secure that [CPFC] or OL makes a Job Offer during the Restricted Period, then Eagle […] shall pay [BL] the sum of USD3,600,000 […] net of tax and social security contributions.
[…]
2.10 Any payment from Eagle […] to [BL] under clauses 2.7 […] shall be made by 29 April 2024’.
Further, clause 3 of the Retainment Agreement stated:
‘3.1 If, during the Restricted Period, the Head Coach accepts an offer of employment from a Sporting Entity that would prevent him from accepting a role as head coach of Crystal Palace’s or OL’s men’s professional football first team during the Restricted Period, then he shall pay compensation of USD3,600,000 (three million, six hundred thousand dollars only) to Eagle Holdings Limited.
3.2 Any payment due from [BL] to Eagle […] under clause 3.1 shall be paid by 29 April 2024’.
Clauses 9 and 10 of the Retainment Agreement dealt with governing law and jurisdictional issues, meaning that any dispute arising from the Retainment Agreement is governed by the laws of England and Wales and any claim could be brought in, inter alia, the High Court of England and Wales.
BL claims that Eagle acted in breach of clauses 2.2, 2.7 and 2.10 of the Retainment Contract by failing to provide a Job Offer, and consequently by failing to pay the amount provided for in clause 2.7 by 29 April 2024 or at all. JL therefore claims for payment or alternatively damages for a sum reflecting ‘USD3,600,000 […] net of tax and social security contributions’.
Whilst admitting that a Job Offer was not provided to JL, Eagle is defending the claim on the basis that the Retainment Agreement was an agreement to negotiate in good faith and/or an agreement to agree and is therefore unenforceable, or alternatively that the obligation in clause 2.7 of the Retainment Agreement is an unenforceable penalty clause.
Considering the clearly identifiable obligations imposed upon the parties and the mirrored financial consequences in clauses 2.7 and 3.1 of the Retainment Agreement should either party breach its obligations, it is this author’s opinion that Eagle faces difficulty in defending JL’s claim.
Many thanks to Matt Slater of The Athletic for informing me about this case.
Crystal Palace FC at risk of not being admitted to UEFA Europa League
Following CPFC’s FA Cup success during the 2024/25 season, the club qualified for the UEFA Europa League (“UEL”). However, OL also qualified for the UEL.
Eagle own 87.69% of OL and, reportedly, around 43% of CPFC (albeit it is understood this may be closer to 46%). To compound matters, David Blitzer (“DB”) and Josh Harris own 36% of CPFC between them, and DB also owns a shareholding in Brøndby IF, who qualified for the UEFA Conference League.
Article 5 of the Regulations of the UEL states:
‘5.01 To ensure the integrity of the UEFA club competitions (i.e. UEFA Champions League, UEFA Europa League and UEFA Conference League), the club must be able to prove that as at 1 March 2025 the below multi-club ownership criteria were met and the club must continue to comply with the below criteria from that date until the end of the competition season:
[…]
b. No one may simultaneously be involved, either directly or indirectly, in any capacity whatsoever in the management, administration and/or sporting performance of more than one club participating in a UEFA club competition;
c. No individual or legal entity may have control or influence over more than one club participating in a UEFA club competition, such control or influence being defined in this context as:
i. holding a majority of the shareholders’ voting rights;
ii. having the right to appoint or remove a majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory body of the club;
iii. being a shareholder and alone controlling a majority of the shareholders’ voting rights pursuant to an agreement entered into with other shareholders of the club; or
iv. being able to exercise by any means a decisive influence in the decision-making of the club.
5.02 If two or more clubs fail to meet the criteria aimed at ensuring the integrity of the competition, only one of them may be admitted to a UEFA club competition, in accordance with the following criteria (applicable in descending order) with the exception of the scenarios set out in Paragraph 5.04 and Paragraph 5.05:
a. the club which qualifies on sporting merit for the most prestigious UEFA club competition (i.e., in descending order: UEFA Champions League, UEFA Europa League or UEFA Conference League);
b. the club which was ranked highest in its domestic championship;
c. the club whose association is ranked highest in the access list’.
UEFA has previously provided guidance on the meaning of ‘decisive influence’, as indicated in UEFA Circular Letter no. 25 of 2024 and its reference to articles 4, 64 and 79 of the UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Sustainability Regulations.
Whilst it has been reported in the last week that Eagle has agreed a sale of its shareholding in CPFC, the deadline of 1 March 2025 referred to in article 5.01 of the Regulations of the UEL is likely to be a sticking point. A comparable issue arose in respect of Club León’s removal from the FIFA Club World Cup 2025 in March 2025, as identified in the FIFA Appeal Committee’s decision available here (a subsequent appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport was also dismissed). More recently, and involving a UEFA club competition, Drogheda United FC failed to comply with the 1 March 2025 deadline in respect of its compliance with article 5 of the Regulations of the UEFA Conference League and was ultimately not admitted to the UEFA Conference League (a subsequent appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport was similarly dismissed).
However, it was announced on 24 June 2025 that OL had been relegated from Ligue 1 to Ligue 2, due to OL’s poor financial performance and assessment by the Direction Nationale du Contrôle de Gestion (DNCG), the organisation responsible for overseeing and monitoring the financial performance of football clubs in France. OL announced on the same day that it has appealed the DNCG’s decision.
Further, on 30 June 2025, UEFA’s Club Financial Control Body (“CFCB”), which oversees the application of the UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Sustainability Regulations, including the regulations of UEFA’s club competitions, provided the following update in respect of CPFC’s and OL’s participation in the UEL:
‘[…] the CFCB First Chamber has decided to postpone its assessment of the multi-club ownership case involving [OL] and [CPFC].
This postponement relates to [OL’s] compliance with the settlement agreement concluded with the CFCB First Chamber for its breach of the financial sustainability requirements. As part of this settlement, [OL] agreed on an exclusion from the 2025/26 UEFA club competitions should the French authority (DNCG) confirm the club’s relegation to Ligue 2.
Further details on this multi-club ownership case and this settlement agreement will be communicated in due course’.
A copy of the settlement agreement referred to in UEFA’s statement is currently unavailable on the CFCB’s decisions page. Nonetheless, it appears likely that should OL fail in its appeal against the DNCG’s decision to relegate OL to Ligue 2, then OL will not be admitted to the UEL. This could provide a reprieve for CPFC’s admission to the UEL.
Otherwise, as things stand and applying article 5.02 of the Regulations of the UEL, it is likely that OL will be admitted to the UEL (due to OL’s higher league position in the 2024/25 season than CPFC), Brøndby IF will be admitted to the UEFA Conference League (again due to Brøndby IF’s higher league position in the 2024/25 season than CPFC), and CPFC will not be admitted to any UEFA club competition.
In such circumstances, article 5.03 of the Regulations of the UEL will apply to CPFC: ‘Clubs not that are not admitted are replaced in accordance with Paragraph 4.10’. Article 4.10 of the Regulations of the UEL states:
‘[…] a club that is not admitted to the competition is replaced by the next-best-placed club in the top domestic championship of the same association, provided the new club fulfils the admission criteria and the status of the competition allows such a replacement, safeguarding the sporting integrity of the competition. In such case, the access of the relevant association is adjusted accordingly’.
In such circumstances and based upon the Premier League table season 2024/25 (i) Nottingham Forest FC (“NFFC”) (who qualified for the UEFA Conference League) would become eligible for admission to the UEL; and (ii) following NFFC’s elevation to the UEL and with articles 5.03 and 4.10 being the same in the Regulations of the UEFA Conference League, Brighton & Hove Albions FC would become eligible for admission to the UEFA Conference League.
Manchester City FC sanctioned
Manchester City FC (“MCFC”) has been sanctioned with fines totalling £1,080,000 for late kick-offs and restarts during the 2024/25 season.
The sanction has been imposed by way of a sanction agreement, as was also seen with MCFC in July 2024 and explained in Football Law’s July 2024 Roundup.
Sheffield Wednesday FC sanctioned
Sheffield Wednesday FC (“SWFC”) has been sanctioned with a three-window transfer embargo for exceeding 30 days of late payments between 1 July 2024 and 30 June 2025 (see EFL Regulations, reg. 52.6.3(c)). The EFL’s statement confirming the sanction identifies that SWFC intends to appeal against the sanction.
Additionally, SWFC and its owner Dejphon Chansiri have been charged in respect of failures to pay players’ wages on time and in full in March 2025 and May 2025 (see EFL Regulations, reg. 64.7).
Women’s Super League expansion
As explained in Football Law’s August 2024 Roundup, on 15 August 2024, Women’s Professional League’s Limited (“WPLL”) assumed responsibility for the Women’s Super League (“WSL”) and the Women’s Championship (“WC”) from the FA.
Each club in the in WSL and WC became a shareholder of WPLL, and the FA became a Special Shareholder. As Special Shareholder, the FA retained the power to ultimately approve, inter alia, changes to the names of the WSL and the WC, and changes to the number of members of the WSL or WC or rules relating to promotion and relegation across / between the WSL and WC (see article 7 of WPLL’s Articles of Association).
On 12 May 2025, the WPLL announced that it had changed its company name to Women’s Super League Football Limited (“WSLFL”), and that the WC will now be known as the Women’s Super League 2 (“WSL2”), effective from the 2025/26 season.
Further, on 20 June 2025, the FA announced that the FA Board had approved plans by WSLFL to increase the size of the WSL to 14 clubs and amendments to the rules relating to promotion and relegation across / between the WSL and WSL2, effective from the end of the 2025/26 season onwards.
Ghanaian football club Right to Dream FC succeed in referring Electronic Player Passport case back to FIFA
Right to Dream FC (“RTD”) had a close shave in its appeal against a final notification of an Electronic Player Passport and allocation statement (“EPP”) issued under FIFA’s Clearing House Regulations (“CHR”) in respect of the football player Ernest Nuamah Appiah (“ENA”).
Article 10.5(b) of the CHR permits appeals against final notifications of an EPP to be made to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“the CAS”).
In particular, RTD sought to appeal on the basis that ENA’s EPP stated that ENA was registered with Ghanian football club Stadium Youth Club (“SYC”) from 1 August 2015 to 18 March 2019 and, therefore, would be entitled to training rewards in respect of the same. As SYC no longer existed, and subject to providing relevant evidence demonstrating that the club no longer exists, such training rewards pass to the Ghanaian Football Association (“GFA”) (see FIFA’s Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, Annexe 4, article 3.3, and Annexe 5, article 2.4).
RTD asserted that the EPP was incorrect as ENA was registered with RTD from 2 December 2013 to 27 January 2022 and appealed to the CAS on that basis.
RTD sought relief consisting of, inter alia, setting aside the EPP and correcting the same to reflect RTD’s position on ENA’s registration with RTD, or alternatively for the EPP to be annulled and sent back to FIFA for renewed consideration (see article R57 of the CAS Code).
However, whilst FIFA was identified as a respondent in the appeal, RTD failed to include the GFA as a respondent in its appeal.
FIFA sought to have the appeal dismissed on the basis that, inter alia, the GFA had not been included as a respondent (and in the absence of any joinder or intervention; see article R41.2-41.4 of the CAS Code).
Ordinarily, this would have been the end of an appeal.
However, the CAS Sole Arbitrator’s decision, which generally provides a practical insight into the workings of the FIFA Clearing House process / EPP process, stated the following at paragraph 165:
‘The Sole Arbitrator can only agree with FIFA in that he should not delve into the merits, as there would be the risk that any decision taken on the merits without the GFA would violate the GFA’s right to be heard and could well impact on its financial position too. However, this does not necessarily mean that the Appeal must be rejected. Article R57 of the CAS Code provides the Sole Arbitrator with alternative powers, as detailed below’.
The evidence provided to the CAS also identified that a further EPP generated following a further international transfer of ENA identified that RTS was entitled to training rewards in respect of the period the previous EPP indicated ENA was registered with SYC (see paragraph 43 of the decision). Further, it appears that GFA did not provide any evidence to supports its entitlement to any training rewards (see paragraph 75).
In such circumstances and avoiding any consideration of the merits of RTD’s appeal, the Sole Arbitrator decided as follows:
‘172. There is some evidence that is new to FIFA that the Appellant has produced during the course of the matter at hand. The Sole Arbitrator cannot ask the GFA about this evidence, as it not a party to the matter at hand. However, if the matter is back with FIFA, then it can make these enquiries of the GFA and decide if a mistake has been made by the GFA and whether a fresh decision concerning which entity is entitled to the solidarity compensation for the Contested Period should be rendered.
173. On balance, the need for the correct outcome has persuaded the Sole Arbitrator that the matter should be sent back to FIFA to consider the new evidence with the GFA’.
The decision is a sensible and right one, and it is troubling why FIFA would go through so much trouble to try to deny RTD the full training rewards that it appears to be clearly entitled to.
CAS appeal shows pitfall in FIFA’s Football Agent Regulations
A successful appeal to the CAS by a football agent has identified a pitfall in respect of article 21 of FIFA’s Football Agent Regulations (“FFAR”), which has been suspended since 30 December 2023 following FIFA Circular 1873 (and following challenges to the FFAR, as explained in previous Football Law Roundups and summarised in the March 2024 Roundup).
Jonathan Beckett (“JB”), football agent at ARETÉ, was issued with a formal warning by the FA in August 2024 for his alleged involvement / performance of agent services in respect of English footballer Tommi O’Reilly’s (“TO”) contract renewal with Aston Villa FC (“AVFC”) in January 2024. JB was not an FA Registered Football Agent at the time of such alleged agent activity.
The formal warning imposed on JB by the FA reflected the ‘uncertainty caused by the change in [the FFAR and the FA’s Football Agent Regulations (“FAFAR”)]’ at the relevant time (see paragraph 28 of the CAS Panel’s decision). However, there was never any formal charge or finding of any breach of the FAFAR made by a FA Regulatory Commission or otherwise.
Following a football agent licence application being submitted by JB on 27 March 2024, JB was registered as a FIFA licensed agent on 30 May 2024 (“JB’s Licence”). One of the eligibility requirements for registration as FIFA licensed agent is ‘in the 24 months before the submission of a licence application, never have been found performing Football Agent Services without the required licence’ (emphasis added) (FFAR, article 5.1(b)).
On 2 September 2024, the FA informed FIFA of the formal warning issued against JB. Seemingly unhappy with the FA’s approach and JB’s subsequent explanations around his involvement with TO’s contract renewal, and relying upon the requirement under article 5.1(b) of the FFAR, on 16 September 2024 the FIFA general secretariat sanctioned JB as follows:
‘[JB’s Licence] is provisionally suspended, as per [article 17.1 and 17.3 of the FFAR].
[… JB] is prevented to submit a new licence application in the agent platform until 17 January 2026.
[…] this is a final decision of the FIFA general secretariat for the purposes of article 50 paragraph 1 of the FIFA Statutes’ (“the GS Decision”).
Article 17 of the FFAR states, inter alia:
‘1. If a Football Agent fails to:
a) meet the eligibility requirements at any time;
[…]
2. The FIFA general secretariat is responsible for investigating compliance with the requirements in paragraph 1 of this article.
3. If paragraph 1 a) of this article applies:
a) the FIFA general secretariat will notify the Football Agent that it believes there are grounds to consider that they do not meet the eligibility requirements, and of the automatic provisional suspension; and
b) the matter will be referred to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for its decision’ (emphasis added).
Article 21 of the FFAR states, inter alia:
‘1. The FIFA Disciplinary Committee and, where relevant, the independent Ethics Committee are competent to impose sanctions on any Football Agent or Client that violates these Regulations, the FIFA Statutes or any other FIFA regulations, in accordance with these Regulations, the FIFA Disciplinary Code and the FIFA Code of Ethics. FIFA has jurisdiction regarding:
a) any conduct connected to a Representation Agreement with an international dimension (cf. article 2 par. 2); or
b) any conduct connected to an international transfer or international Transaction’.
JB appealed against the GS Decision to the CAS, submitting, inter alia, that (i) the FFAR did not confer jurisdiction on FIFA’s general secretariat to determine whether JB provided Football Agent Services without a licence or to impose sanctions; and (ii) TO’s contract renewal with AVFC did not have an international dimension or concern an international transfer (see paragraph 65 of the CAS’s decision).
JB invited the CAS to, inter alia, set aside the GS Decision (see paragraph 66 of the CAS’s decision).
The CAS Panel provided the following interpretation of articles 5, 17 and 21 of the FFAR:
‘85. […] (i) f the FIFA General Secretariat forms a belief upon investigation that there are grounds to consider that a Football Agent does not meet the eligibility requirements, in that case’
(ii) the FIFA General Secretariat is required to inform the Football Agent of that belief;
(iii) the FIFA General Secretariat is required to implement an automatic provisional suspension on the Football Agent; and
(iv) the FIFA General Secretariat is required to refer the matter to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for a decision’ (emphasis original).
In respect of JB’s appeal, the CAS Panel then identified:
‘88. […] what is problematic here is that, whereas the FIFA General Secretariat, in principle, legitimately took the first three steps in the process, that is: i) it formed a belief that there were grounds to consider that the Agent did not meet the eligibility requirements; ii) it informed the Agent of that belief; and iii) it implemented an automatic provisional suspension on the Agent, it was unable due to the suspension of Article 21 FFAR from taking the fourth step, that is, the matter could not be referred to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for a decision’.
The CAS Panel continued, and addressing the suggestion that article 17.3(b) of the FFAR could circumvent the suspension of article 21 of the FFAR:
‘89. […] because of the suspension of Article 21 FFAR, the FIFA General Secretariat was barred from referring matters that fall under the scope of the FFAR to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee. In this respect, it is to be noted that FIFA, when asked by the Panel, itself argued at the hearing that the jurisdiction of the FIFA Disciplinary Committee could not be based on Article 17.3(b) FFAR alone, because this might be seen as a circumvention of the suspended Article 21 FFAR, a submission the Panel has to adhere to in this case’.
The CAS Panel also identified that as ‘there is currently no FIFA body competent to decide whether the ongoing eligibility requirements are satisfied, this means that there is also no FIFA body competent to lift the provisional suspension […] this changes the nature of the provisional suspension imposed by the FIFA General Secretariat [… to a] de facto definite or final suspension of [JB’s Licence] until 17 January 2026’ (see paragraph 93 of the CAS Panel’s decision).
Accordingly, the CAS Panel found that the GS Decision was to be set aside as the FIFA general secretariat ‘was not competent to (i) decide whether [JB] provided Football Agent Services without a [licence]; and (ii) implement a de facto definite suspension’ (see paragraph 98 of the CAS Panel’s decision).
Whilst the above-stated analysis is helpful, a quicker route to the same conclusion could have been achieved by simply accepting JB’s argument that TO’s contract renewal with AVFC did not have an international dimension or concern an international transfer.
FA Regulatory Commission provides interpretation of regulation 10.5(a) of the FAFAR
In the case of FA v Accrington Stanley FC, an FA Regulatory Commission was faced with interpreting the meaning of ‘Engage or appoint’ in regulation 10.5 of the FFAR (version 2024/25):
‘Players, Coaches and Clubs (and their Club Officials, when applicable) may not, either directly or indirectly, engage, or attempt to engage, in the following conduct:
a) Engage or appoint a person who is not an FA Registered Football Agent to perform Football Agent Services in relation to any conduct or activity that falls within the scope of these Regulation […]’ (emphasis added).
The Regulatory Commission provided the following helpful interpretation, which will be of interest to Participants faced with a breach of regulation 10.5 of the FFAR:
‘17. The Commission carefully considered the submissions from The FA as to the meaning of Regulation 10.5(a). It started from the position that the proper approach was to give the words their ordinary and natural meaning. It approached its task on the basis that it needed to consider what the words would mean to a reasonable person in possession of all the relevant background information about the context in which the words are used, while also taking into account the document in which they appear as a whole.
18. The Commission acknowledged that the wording of Regulation 10.5(a) could suggest that “engage” and “appoint” were not intended to be synonymous terms, but it did not accept that “engage” should therefore be read as meaning “engage with”, in the broad sense of “have dealings with”. Regulation 10 is headed “Engagement of FA Registered Football Agents” (our emphasis). Regulation 10.1(a) states that Players, Coaches and Clubs (as defined) “may engage an FA Registered Football Agent to perform Football Agent Services”. In the Commission’s view, there could be no doubt as to the ordinary and natural meaning of the word “engage” in Regulation 10. The Regulation was intended to apply to a party that entered into an arrangement with someone pursuant to which the individual in question would perform Services for it. The Club had not entered into any such arrangement. The fact that Regulation 10.5(a) also included the word “appoint” did not change the meaning of the word “engage” they appear as a whole’.
Regulation 10.5 of the FFAR (version 2024/25) is now found in regulation 9.5 of the FFAR (2025/26 version).
CAS announces amendments to the CAS Code will come into force from 1 July 2025
On 17 June 2025, the CAS announced some minor amendments to the CAS Code. A document identifying the amended articles with track changes is available here.
1 July 2025