Seeing the Wood for the Trees
On 15 January 2024 it was announced that Nottingham Forest FC (“NFFC”) had been charged with a breach of the Premier League’s (“PL”) Profitability and Sustainability Rules (“PSR”) (found in Section E of the PL Rules) for the period ending season 2022/23.
NFFC admitted the charge, and therefore the only matter to be determined by a PL Commission was the appropriate sanction (a PL Commission is an independent disciplinary panel formed from the PL’s Judicial Panel; for an explanation of the PL’s Judicial Panel, please see Football Law’s overview of the PL).
On 18 March 2024 it was announced that NFFC had been sanctioned with an immediate four-point deduction for its breach of the PSR. The Commission’s written reasons identify that NFFC breached the PSR upper loss threshold of £61 million (as applicable to NFFC considering its two seasons in the EFL Championship during the three-year reference period) by £34,536,000.[1]
This article considers the Commission’s approach to sanctioning NFFC with an immediate four-point deduction, and, in conclusion, provides a step-by-step process of how to assess and determine a proportionate sanction for a breach of the PSR upper loss threshold.
For those unfamiliar with the PSR, you are invited to read paragraphs [3.2] to [3.7] of the Commission’s written reasons, which provide a very helpful summary.
The issues
NFFC and the PL agreed that in determining the appropriate sanction for NFFC’s breach of the PSR, the Commission had to decide one overarching issue:
‘The Club having admitted a breach of the PSRs, and the amount of the breach (£34,536,000), what is the appropriate sanction, having regard to any mitigating factors?’[2]
NFFC and the PL divided this overarching issue into 14 sub-issues, some of which resulted in considerable overlap in the Commission’s written reasons. The prevalent issues determined by the Commission, and which provide the structure for this article, are as follows:
Should there be a starting point for sanction for breach of the PSR and, if so, what is that starting point?
Did NFFC have any valid points of mitigation?
What is the appropriate sanction?
Should there be a starting point for sanction for breach of the PSR and, if so, what is that starting point?
The question of a “starting point” is an interesting one that is commonly asked by sports’ disciplinary commissions: is the proposed sanction by either party reflective of a starting position to which the general circumstances and mitigating and aggravating factors have been applied, or is it simply a holistically proportionate sanction? Where a sport’s governing body’s or competition organiser’s rules do not provide any starting point in sanction guidelines, or if there is a dearth of directly comparable cases, the question is not easily answerable and can create a grey area when considering what the proportionate sanction is.
In NFFC’s case, the Commission stated that it drew much from the Appeal Board’s decision in Everton Football Club Company Limited v The Football Association Premier League Limited (t/a The Premier League) (“the Everton Appeal”) (which is discussed in this earlier Football Law article: ‘Everton’s Appeal Provides Sanction Guidance’).[3] The Commission also stated that ‘having a starting point (as the EFL have in its Guidelines and as the Appeal Board used) assists clubs and the regulator’.[4]
The Commission then provided the following guidance:
‘The Commission considers that it would assist to band breaches into “minor”, “significant” or “major” breaches, to remove the focus on the absolute number, especially when different PSR Thresholds can apply. However, that approach can be adopted/disregarded as other Commissions see fit - what is clear to the Commission here is, just like Everton, that Forest’s losses are “significant”, as are its excesses over its PSR Threshold, so that it should face a points sanction. As such, and as the Appeal Board in the Everton Appeal determined at [201 to 204], other available sanctions, such as warnings, fines, embargos and the like are not appropriate in the case at hand’ (emphasis added).[5]
The Commission then went to conclude on this issue of a starting point as follows:
‘The Commission agrees with the Appeal Board in the Everton Appeal that the entry point for a significant breach should be a deduction of 3 points and this will have the added advantage of achieving consistency with that decision. The Commission will then consider both Forest’s particular circumstances and the quantum of the breach, that might slide it up or down the points scale to find its starting point, before mitigation (and aggravation, if there was any) is considered; and finally dealing with such matters as suspension’.[6]
The Commission’s answer contains the nuance of differentiating between an ‘entry point’ and a ‘starting point’. The entry point focuses on the banding of a club’s breach of the PSR – be it minor, significant, or major – which is determined by the quantum of a club’s losses over the PSR upper loss threshold. From that entry point the commission then considers and applies a club’s circumstances around the breach and considers the quantum of the breach within the banding of its breach to reach the starting point.
Whilst that guidance is understandable, respectfully, the rationale of applying a three-point deduction as the entry point for a significant breach of the PSR appears misguided. The Appeal Board in the Everton Appeal did not rely upon an entry point – or a starting point – of a three-point deduction for a significant breach of the PSR or generally.
The only reference by the Appeal Board to a three-point deduction in the Everton Appeal was in respect of the minimum three-point deduction (subject to any mitigating or aggravating factors) to be imposed where there has been a breach of the upper loss threshold in the EFL’s Championship Profitability and Sustainability Rules (“CPSR”) and applying the EFL’s Sanction Guidelines (“the EFL Sanction Guidelines”).[7] The Appeal Board stated in the Everton Appeal that the EFL Sanction Guidelines ‘cannot be automatically translated across in a linear way’ to a breach of the PSR.[8] Moreover, even on EFC’s own case that sought to apply the EFL Sanction Guidelines in a linear way, the entry point would have been a six-point deduction, not a three-point deduction.[9]
Indeed, one of the notable features of the Everton Appeal is the absence of any breakdown of the six-point deduction imposed by the Appeal Board. The Appeal Board did not specify which of those six points accounted for the quantum of EFC’s breach of the PSR, the mitigating factor of an improved trend for its final year in the relevant three-year period, and the two aggravating factors of, firstly, the extent of EFC’s breach of the PSR and, secondly, EFC providing wrong information to the PL in respect of its relevant PSR Calculation.[10]
The Commission in NFFC’s case also provided one further point that is also worthy of note in this section of this article.
In the Everton Appeal, the Appeal Board stated that:
‘[…] leaving any mitigation aside, only a points deduction is appropriate for a breach of [the upper loss threshold in the PSR …] it is clear from the context of the PL Rules, any [such] breach […] is a serious matter […] In our view, only a points deduction, with its immediate and overt effect, has the appropriate power of disincentive for clubs to remain within the upper loss threshold required to maintain the aim of an FFP regime. It also, in our view, addresses both the financial and sporting aspects in the most appropriate way’.[11]
The Commission in NFFC’s case stated, obiter, that it:
‘[…] has some doubts as to whether the blanket approach suggested by the Appeal Board in the Everton Appeal is always going to be appropriate […]
Rather than solely focusing on the quantum of the breach, it may assist to consider those in categories or bands. The example of the £1 over breach must be a “minor” breach, for which a points deduction may not be appropriate. There will be “significant” breaches that will more than likely result in a starting point of a points deduction; these could be in the tens of millions. Then there may also be “major” breaches which will undoubtedly result in a starting point of points off and may even stray above the Event of Insolvency “cap” that has been advanced by Forest.
This line of this thinking can be left to one side for future Commissions to consider’.[12]
The point raised is interesting, and again indicates issues arising from the absence of any sanction guidelines from the PL for a breach of the PSR upper loss threshold, which forces Commissions and Appeal Boards to make decisions in unchartered territory.
However, the concern expressed by the Commission in NFFC’s case does not seem entirely fair for three reasons.
Firstly, the Appeal Board’s analysis in the Everton Appeal demonstrated that a breach of the PSR upper loss threshold by a club that has been in the PL for the three years covered by a relevant PSR Calculation is already a loss above £105 million, which, in any event, ‘is a serious matter warranting serious concern’.[13]
Secondly, and comparatively, the EFL Sanction Guidelines, which the Appeal Board in the Everton Appeal noted as providing ‘some useful assistance in assessing appropriate sanctions for breach of the PSR’, provide for a minimum of a three-point deduction, subject to any mitigating and aggravating factors, where the quantum of the breach is anything from £1 up to £2 million.[14]
Thirdly, and similarly, the point does not sit with the availability of a Commission or Appeal Board – absent any sanction guidelines from the PL – to impose a point deduction as low as one point and/or the ability to apply mitigating factors that can reduce any point deduction for a breach of the PSR upper loss threshold to a proportionate level (possibly even to zero / no points deduction). The Appeal Board in the Everton Appeal did not rule this out in its observation quoted above, and which is emphasised at [201] of its decision:
‘[…] we have no doubt that, leaving aside mitigating factors, any breach of rule E.51 (i.e. any PSR Calculation showing losses of over £105m over the relevant period) warrants a points deduction, and nothing less than a points deduction’ (emphasis added).
Did NFFC have any valid points of mitigation?
Whilst a club should expect a point deduction for a breach of the PSR upper loss threshold, if it can prove that there are valid points of mitigation, then the same can reduce the point deduction.
The Commission confirmed that the Appeal Board’s approach to mitigating factors in the Everton Appeal provides clear guidance.[15] In summary, a party seeking to rely upon a mitigating factor bears the burden of proving that mitigating factor. Further, circumstances are only mitigating factors ‘when marked against the aims of the regime in which sanctions are being imposed’.[16]
There were nine issues relating to NFFC’s mitigation, but only six points of mitigation were relied upon by NFFC, and which were noted as having some crossover with the ‘particular circumstances’ of NFFC’s breach of the PSR threshold.[17]
Firstly, was NFFC in a unique position as the only club in the PL in the 2022/23 season that was either not previously in the PL, and therefore unable to take advantage of the higher PSR upper loss threshold, or otherwise having previously not had the benefit of parachute payments while in the EFL Championship?
NFFC failed with this head of mitigation. Put simply, the Commission noted that ‘12 other clubs over the last 10 years of the [PL …] had been promoted without the benefit of a Parachute Payment the year before. They then joined a league where the other 17 teams all had a [PL] squad and, in the main, would have the benefit of the full £105 million PSR Threshold. This is not a unique occurrence, rather it is something that has happened every season in the previous 10 seasons, on average’.[18]
The Commission emphasised that NFFC should have been aware of the PSR upper loss threshold and that the club could have, and should have, taken appropriate steps to ensure that it worked within the PSR upper loss threshold.[19]
Moreover, the evidence available to the Commission demonstrated that by the end of September 2022, ‘it was clear that PSR was a real issue to [NFFC]’ and yet it continued to acquire players in January 2023 [20], and there were ‘few documents that demonstrated what [NFFC] was doing about its PSR issue’.[21]
Secondly, did NFFC breach the PSR upper loss threshold because of a “near miss” following the sale of Brennan Johnson (“BJ”) to Tottenham Hotspur FC (“THFC”) on 1 September 2023, two months after its financial year end of 30 June 2023?
It was accepted by NFFC that ‘selling [BJ] was the only solution to the PSR breach it was forecasting’.[22] As outlined in the PL’s submissions, NFFC’s Adjusted Earnings Before Tax for the financial year ending 30 June 2022 showed losses of £40 million and that ‘together with the loss in the previous years, it would have been clear to [NFFC] early in the season […] that its loss for FY23 needed to be materially lower […] if it was not to exceed the £61m PSR Threshold’.[23]
Indeed, evidence from NFFC’s former chief executive officer identified:
‘From around February 2023, I knew that the Club would have to sell a valuable […] player for significant profit in order to ensure compliance with the PSR. Due to my understanding of football finance and accounting I knew that the player would have to be [BJ] […] This was obvious’.[24]
Further, evidence from NFFC’s finance director identified:
‘[…] in April and May 2023 […] there was regular discussion about the fact that, in order to comply with the PSR, [NFFC] needed to realise circa £30m profit on player sales by 30 June 2023 […] Further, there was a common understanding […] that [BJ] […] was the player that needed to be sold’.[25]
The position of the PL was that NFFC ‘should have had no choice: the sale [of BJ] had to happen before the end of June 2023, or it would breach the PSR threshold’, and there was evidence that the PL ‘expressly warned’ NFFC of the same on 6 June 2023.[26]
NFFC had valued BJ at £50 million.[27] It was accepted that NFFC had made some efforts in respect of selling BJ in May and June 2023, but ultimately no sale took place on or before 30 June 2023.[28]
Evidence of offers received by NFFC for BJ included: (i) NFFC not accepting an offer of €50 million from Atlético de Madrid (“Atleti”) on 30 June 2023, the last day of NFFC’s financial year for 2023, but albeit contingent on Atleti selling a player; and (ii) NFFC not accepting offers of £32.5 million, £35 million, and £40 million from Brentford FC (“BFC”) on 21 July 2023, 24 July 2023, and 28 August 2023 respectively.[29]
Ultimately, NFFC considered THFC’s offer of £47.5 million on 1 September 2023 to be acceptable.[30]
The Commission noted that the ‘actual “near miss” could be that [NFFC] nearly missed selling [BJ] in the summer window altogether’.[31] Focusing on the relevant date of 30 June 2023 for this issue, the Commission noted that NFFC ‘took a huge risk leaving itself with only one way to avoid a PSR breach, selling [BJ] in a two-week window between the summer 2023 transfer window opening and 30 June 2023’.[32] The Commission also stated that the negotiations with BFC stood out. It was noted that BFC’s first two offers were sent on 21 July 2023 and 24 July 2023 respectively, much closer to BFC’s financial year end, but both of which were rejected despite the second offer being for £35 million and which would have ‘practically taken care of the PSR breach’.[33]
Bringing those elements together, NFFC failed with this head of mitigation for the following reasons:
‘[…] what really matters is the integrity of the competition and how the public and other clubs saw Forest behaving; along with the fairness to the other clubs playing in the competition and abiding by the PSR. In the eyes of the other clubs, had [NFFC] sold [BJ] within the first few weeks following the PSR deadline, this would demonstrate a willingness to comply, so why not make the “miss” as near as it could? It may have cost [NFFC] some money, but it would have demonstrated that [NFFC] showed some respect for the Rules, its fellow clubs and the competition and reacted as soon as it could.
[…]
The Commission understands all clubs desire to sell their players for the most they can achieve. That is a sensible commercial decision to take for any business. However, the Commission here concluded that for [NFFC] respecting the PSR regime and looking to make the miss as near as possible was a less important factor, when compared to maximising value/profit’.[34]
Thirdly, was NFFC’s breach of the PSR caused by, inter alia, the cost of promotion to the PL and an inaccurate estimation as to the ‘Merit Award’ NFFC would receive for its league position in the 2022/23 season?
NFFC also failed with this head of mitigation.
NFFC incurred costs of £20.92 million following promotion to the PL, £18.6 million of which related to player and staff bonuses.[35] Quite rightly, the Commission noted that ‘there is nothing unique about this: all of [NFFC’s] closest competitors are likely to have paid large promotion bonuses’.[36]
In respect of the merit award, being the money distributed to PL clubs in respect of UK and international broadcast revenues based upon a club’s league position at the end of the season, NFFC submitted that it inaccurately estimated its league position for the end of the 2022/23 season.[37] NFFC’s position was that it had received c. £12.5 million less than anticipated, and that NFFC ‘was particularly susceptible to the impact of a reasonable but ultimately mistaken projection as compared with most other clubs’.[38]
The Commission believed the difference in the estimated merit award and the merit award received ‘was wrong and it affected [NFFC’s] PSR forecast, but not by enough to change the fact there was a significant PSR breach and, again, how [NFFC] chose to forecast was its own business decision’.[39]
Fourthly, did NFFC obtain any sporting advantage from its breach of the PSR upper loss threshold?
NFFC also failed with this head of mitigation.
NFFC submitted that it did not obtain any sporting advantage from its breach, albeit NFFC’s submission was strangely limited to the period from 1 July 2023 to 1 September 2023 (i.e., after its financial year end for 2023 to when BJ was sold to THFC).[40] NFFC’s rationale was that had it sold BJ before 30 June 2023, then there would have been no breach of the PSR upper loss threshold.
The Commission noted:
‘[NFFC] bought extensively in summer 2022 […] knew it was in trouble with PSR before the end of 2022 and rather than sell one of its best players […] in the January 2023 window […] it bought more players in that window and its PSR position got worse […]
[NFFC] effectively went through the entire 2022/23 season with a squad that it could not afford […] The Commission […] cannot ignore this and give mitigation to [NFFC] when it is right to infer that [NFFC] would have enjoyed a sporting advantage over that season’.[41]
The Commission also inferred that NFFC gained some sporting advantage in playing BJ in games at the beginning of the 2022/23 season before being sold to THFC.[42]
Put simply, NFFC failed to rebut the presumption that a sporting advantage is to be inferred when there is a breach of the PSR upper loss threshold.
Fifthly, did NFFC’s good record with financial fair play rules and its positive trend amount to mitigation?
NFFC also failed with this head of mitigation.
NFFC’s good record with financial fair play rules did not amount to mitigation. The Commission noted that EFC was not given any credit for its previous PSR compliance in the Everton Appeal (nor in the Commission’s first instance decision), and that ‘clubs should comply with the PSR’.[43] Mere compliance with the PSR is expected and does not provide extra credit when a breach occurs. However, it should be noted that in other sports disciplinary matters a participant’s clean disciplinary record is regularly relied upon in mitigation, albeit that the applicable disciplinary regulations will usually expressly state that this is a mitigating factor.[44] Moreover, it is appreciated that to allow mitigation where a club otherwise has a good record with financial fair play rules would be difficult to quantify – especially if it is to apply to every club that has a good financial fair play record – and would be difficult to square with the purpose and aims of financial fair play rules.
NFFC also relied upon steps it had taken to improve its PSR position going forward, which indicated that NFFC was ‘projecting to realise losses of approximately £12-17m for the year ending 30 June 2024’.[45]
However, as identified in the Everton Appeal and relied upon by the PL, financial years outside of the reference period to which the breach of the PSR upper loss threshold relates are irrelevant.[46] A breach of the PSR upper loss threshold relates to years T, T-1, and T-2, not T+1, T, T-1, and T-2. The Commission agreed with the Appeal Board’s decision on this point in the Everton Appeal.[47]
Sixthly, did NFFC’s cooperation amount to mitigation?
NFFC succeeded with this head of mitigation, with the PL admitting that this ‘constitutes substantial mitigation which together justify a material reduction in sanction’.[48]
The PL accepted that an admission at the earliest opportunity warrants a reduction in sanction by a maximum of one-third.[49]
The PL also indicated that NFFC’s cooperation ‘significantly reduced the costs of enforcement and assisted the Commission’ and that ‘[it] is desirable that such cooperation be recognised and given credit, both because it is deserved, and in order to create appropriate incentives for respondent clubs in future PSR cases’.[50]
The Commission agreed with the PL, and in respect of NFFC’s cooperation it helpfully provided a list of the steps taken by NFFC in cooperating with the PL.[51] PL clubs facing a breach of the PSR, or similar, are strongly advised to consider those steps which would amount to ‘exceptional cooperation’.[52]
What is the appropriate sanction?
At the hearing, it is noted that NFFC accepted ‘an entry point of three points as the starting point in a “normal” case but submitted it should be a lower starting point here as “in the round” this case is not as serious as Everton’.[53] Comment has already been provided above as to why this author considers the Commission was misguided in applying a three-point deduction as the entry point for a significant breach of the PSR appears misguided, and it is unclear why NFFC accepted this position and/or what it meant by a ‘"normal” case’.
The Commission, as seen in the Everton Appeal, noted that ‘there is no fixed formula to use’.[54] However, working on the basis that a three-point deduction was the entry point decided in the Everton Appeal, the Commission stated:
‘The Commission can see the merit in adopting the Appeal Board’s approach in the Everton Appeal when dealing with a significant breach. As such, the entry point should be a three-point deduction too’.[55]
Further, as NFFC’s breach was £34.5 million and more than 57% the applicable £61 million PSR upper loss threshold, compared to EFC’s breach which was £19.5 million and 19% more than the applicable £105 million PSR upper loss threshold, this moved NFFC ‘up the scale by three further points to a starting point of six points’.[56]
In applying the two points of mitigation (early admission and cooperation), the Commission considered these together and deducted two points, resulting in an immediate four-point deduction for NFFC.[57] It is emphasised here that the maximum reduction to sanction for an early admission is one-third (a maximum of a 2-point reduction in this context), and that the Commission was not bound to apply a one-third reduction, and then a further reduction for NFFC’s cooperation. The overarching principle of proportionality and the four principles of sanction (punishment, vindication of compliant clubs, deterrent and integrity) were also part of the Commission’s approach to determining the appropriate sanction.[58]
The Commission also decided not to suspend the four-point deduction or any part of it. The Commission noted that suspension of a points deduction is a ‘useful tool, in the right circumstances’ but noted that its use in comparable EFL CPSR cases had been in circumstances of entering into an Agreed Decision (as defined in the EFL Regulations) with a “carrot and stick” approach.[59]
Conclusion
The decision provides another step towards a workable process of how to assess and determine a proportionate sanction for a breach of the PSR upper loss threshold. In this author’s opinion, the process to be applied is as follows:
A Commission or Appeal Board will have in mind the purposes and disciplinary aims of the PSR. The purpose of PSR is to provide a disciplined framework within which football clubs work within to avoid unsustainable spending and jeopardising the club and the integrity of the PL. The disciplinary aims are punishment, vindication of compliant clubs, deterrent, and integrity, albeit punishment is not the most important aim.
A breach of the PSR is very likely to result in a points deduction, or at a minimum a points deduction will be the entry point and/or starting point.
In deciding the proportionate points deduction, firstly, a Commission or Appeal Board (as the case may be) will determine an entry point depending on the quantum of the breach beyond the PSR upper loss threshold, which may be categorised as a minor, significant, or major breach. A breach of the PSR upper loss threshold of between c. £19 million to c. £35 million falls within the range of a significant breach.
Secondly, a Commission or Appeal Board will consider the circumstances surrounding the breach and the quantum of the breach, which may slide that entry point up or down to arrive at a starting point. Consideration of the quantum of the breach at this stage appears to relate to the quantum as it falls within the range of the breach (i.e., be it minor, significant, or major).[60] A quantum at the lower end of a particular range could result in the points deduction sliding down from the entry point, or at the least not increasing above the entry point.
When considering steps one and two, a Commission or Appeal Board should bear in mind (i) the comparable sanction of an immediate nine-point deduction for an Event of Insolvency under PL Rules, r. E.37; and (ii) comparable cases, albeit each case turns on its own facts.
Thirdly, a Commission or Appeal Board will consider any mitigating or aggravating factors, which may deduct or add to the starting point. Circumstances are only mitigating or aggravating factors when marked against the aims of the PSR. Some mitigating factors may overlap with the circumstances considered in the second stage of this exercise. Business decisions, the consequences of a points deduction (save for exceptional circumstances), previous compliance with financial fair play rules, and a positive trend beyond the relevant three-year reference period will not amount to mitigating factors.
A sporting advantage is to be presumed where there has been a breach of the PSR upper loss threshold. However, while difficult in practice, this presumption is rebuttable and if rebutted may act as a mitigating factor.
Whilst a near miss with a deadline that affects a club’s PSR Calculation can amount to a mitigating factor, clubs should ensure compliance with deadlines.
If a club admits its breach of the PSR upper loss threshold at the earliest opportunity, the club will be entitled to a reduction of up to one third from the starting point.
If a club provides exceptional cooperation in line with the conduct seen by NFFC and recorded in the Commission’s decision, then this will amount to mitigation.
If a club can demonstrate that losses in years T and/or T-1 are lower than T-1 and/or T-2 (as the case may be), then this would be a positive trend and amount to mitigation.
Previous breaches of the PSR and the extent of the PSR breach (if not counted at the second stage) can amount to aggravating factors.[61]
It is unlikely that any points deduction, or any part of a points deduction, will be suspended.
On 25 March 2024 it was announced that NFFC has appealed against the Commission’s decision, and therefore the above-stated process is subject to the outcome of that decision.
In this author’s opinion, the Commission’s decision to apply an entry point of a three-point deduction for a significant breach of the PSR, which is purportedly based on the Appeal Board’s decision in the Everton Appeal, respectfully, appears to be an error of law and the most likely basis upon which an appeal could be successful.
Footnotes
[1] The Premier League v Nottingham Forest Football Club Limited, Premier League Commission (Ch. Mark Hovell), 18 March 2024, [3.11] and [5.19-5.22]; PL Rules, r. E.53 and E.54.
[2] The Premier League v Nottingham Forest Football Club Limited, [7.1].
[3] (n1), [9.16]; Premier League Appeal Board (Ch. The Rt. Hon. Sir Gary Hickinbottom), 26.2.2024.
[4] (n1), [9.16].
[5] Ibid, [9.18].
[6] Ibid, [9.20].
[7] Everton Football Club Company Limited v The Football Association Premier League Limited (t/a The Premier League), Premier League Appeal Board (Ch. The Rt. Hon. Sir Gary Hickinbottom), 26.2.2024, [45]-[46], [150(v)] and [209]-[210].
[8] Ibid, [209]-[213].
[9] Ibid, [210].
[10] Ibid, [207]-[227]; (n1), [14.15].
[11] (n7), [202].
[12] (n1), [13.2]-[13.4].
[13] (n7), [132]; see also [150(iii)] and [201].
[14] Ibid, [213]; see also [45]-[46].
[15] (n1), [10.5]. See also (n7), [80]-[95].
[16] (n7), [82].
[17] (n1), [7.1], [12.1] and [12.2].
[18] Ibid, [12.15].
[19] Ibid, [12.16]-[12.21] and [12.24].
[20] Ibid, [12.21].
[21] Ibid, [12.22].
[22] Ibid, [12.23].
[23] Ibid, [12.34]; see also [3.11].
[24] Ibid, [12.35].
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid, [12.36].
[27] Ibid, [12.27].
[28] Ibid, [12.28] and [12.46].
[29] Ibid, [12.30].
[30] Ibid, [12.29].
[31] Ibid, [12.49].
[32] Ibid, [12.52].
[33] Ibid, [12.55]-[12.56].
[34] Ibid, [12.54] and [12.58].
[35] Ibid, [12.60] and [12.66].
[36] Ibid, [12.66] and [12.74].
[37] Ibid, [12.64]; see also Premier League Rules, rr. A.1.165, D.17.2 and D.19.2.
[38] Ibid, [12.64]-[12.65].
[39] Ibid, [12.76]; see also (n7), [94].
[40] Ibid, [12.77], [12.81] and [12.88].
[41] Ibid, [12.89]-[12.90]; see also (n7), [147]-[150(ii)].
[42] (n1), [12.91].
[43] Ibid, [12.95] and [12.99].
[44] Cf. FA Disciplinary Regulations, Part A – General Provisions, Section Two, para. 42.2.
[45] (n1), [12.92].
[46] Ibid, [12.96].
[47] Ibid, [12.99].
[48] Ibid, [12.3] and [12.107].
[49] Ibid, [12.103].
[50] Ibid, [12.104].
[51] Ibid, [12.105]-[12.106].
[52] Cf. (n7), [113]-[114].
[53] (n1), [14.10].
[54] Ibid, [14.11].
[55] Ibid, [14.13].
[56] Ibid, [14.1.2] and [14.15].
[57] Ibid, [14.17].
[58] Ibid, [9.15] and [14.23]; see also (n7), [194]-[200].
[59] Ibid, [14.20]-[14.23]; cf. (n7), [228]; EFL Regulations. Reg. 86.
[60] (n1), [13.3].
[61] Ibid, [11.3]; cf. (n7), [85] and [225(i)].
8 April 2024